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THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
EFFECT ON THE RIGHT TO APPEAL OF REFUSAL TO COMPLY
WITH ORDERS OF THE COURT
Ihe California cases are not in harmony on the question whether an appel-
late court may dismiss or stay an appeal for failure of the appellant to obey
the trial court's orders. The problem has arisen most frequently where the
appellant has failed to pay various fees, and where he has been guilty of con-
tumacious conduct regarding the custody of children in divorce actions.
The Custody Cases
In the early case of Vosburg v. Vosburg' a wife brought an action of divorce
against her husband. She was granted a divorce and custody of the two younger
children and the defendant was granted custody of the eldest son. Prior to the
commencement of the action the youth had been taken to New York by the
defendant after he promised the plaintiff he would return in the fall. When the
defendant failed to fulfill his promise it was decreed that he should bring the
boy back to California and keep him within the jurisdiction of the court. The
defendant failed to heed this order and the court awarded custody of the eldest
child to the respondent and again directed the defendant to return the boy to
California. The defendant appealed and the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the
appeal because of the defendant's failure to obey the orders of the court. The
court refused to grant the motion to dismiss, stating that "there is no precedent
for dismissing an appeal for the reasons here relied on. ' 2 Thus the Vosburg
decision became the precedent for refusal to dismiss an appeal despite the appel-
lant's disregard of the court's orders.
MacPherson v. MacPherson3 also involved an appeal in a divorce action by
a father who refused to obey the court's command that he bring his children back
into the jurisdiction. Despite the precedent set by Vosburg the court dismissed
the appeal without mentioning that decision. Apparently concerned with an
affront to its dignity, the court reasoned that "a party to an action cannot, with
right or reason, ask the aid and assistance of a court in hearing his demands
while he stands in contempt to its legal orders and processes .... ,,4 The result
of the dismissal was in effect an affirmance of the judgment appealed from, since
the dismissal was not expressly made without prejudice. 5 Therefore it seems that
the appellant was precluded from pressing a further appeal if he should subse-
quently purge himself of contempt. 6
1 131 Cal. 628, 63 Pac. 1009 (1901).
2 Id. at 630, 63 Pac. at 1010.
3 13 Cal. 2d 271, 89 P.2d 382 (1939).
' Id. at 277, 89 P.2d at 385, quoting from Weeks v. Superior Court, 187 Cal. 620, 203 Pac.
93 (1921). In MacPherson, contrary to Vosburg, the defendant had been held in contempt of
court. The cases cannot be distinguished on that ground, however, since Tobin v. Casaus,
128 Cal. App. 2d 588, 275 P.2d 792 (1954), has held that a dismissal of an appeal without an
adjudication of the appellants contempt is proper.
8 CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 955.
' No case has been found that allowed an appellant to appeal after his appeal had been
dismissed, unless it was dismissed without prejudice.
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Neither Vosburg nor MacPherson reached a desirable result. A party who
knows that he can appeal despite his refusal to comply with an adverse judg-
ment will be encouraged to speculate on the result of his appeal by disregarding
the lower court's order. On the other hand, a party whose right to appeal has
been finally denied will have no incentive to obey an order, such as that in
Vosburg and MacPherson, which cannot be enforced. These considerations
make it desirable that the courts resolve the problem by adopting the solution
developed in cases involving non-payment of fees: the granting of a stay of
appeal to allow the appellant to purge himself of contempt or disobedience.
The Fees Cases
The orders disobeyed most commonly involve the payment of alimony, sup-
port, and attorney's fees. In an early Supreme Court case, Borenstein v. Boren-
stein,7 the plaintiff moved to dismiss "upon the sole ground that the order allowing
attorney's fees and costs has not been complied with... ." ,, The court held that
a failure to pay the allowed compensation would not merit a dismissal and denied
the motion. But the court did allow a stay of the appeal.9
However, there are cases which criticize the view that a stay is a suitable
redress where fees have not been paid.10 One case'1 pointed to Tobin v. Casaus,
12
where a stay was given and the defendant failed to take advantage of the
court's generosity, 13 thereby wasting the court's time by putting off the inevitable
dismissal. It seems that the reason behind the dismissal of the appeal is the
court's apprehension that if the motion to dismiss were denied it would result
in a flagrant abuse of the court's processes. 14 Yet the view more consonant with
reason is the granting of a stay of appeal. If the appeal is stayed the appellant
is encouraged to obey the orders of the court because he cannot press his appeal
until he does so. But if the appeal is dismissed, in all probability the appellant
will never pay the delinquent fees and the respondent will be left without the
needed compensation.
The Stay of Appeal
Other cases treating a motion for stay of appeal indicate that the courts have
developed a doctrine of discretion. In Pugliese v. Pugliese'5 respondent moved
for a stay of appeal until the appellant paid attorney's fees for the pending appeal
as well as the trial, as ordered by the superior court. The refusal of the motion
" 11 Cal. 2d 301, 79 P.2d 388 (1938).
8 Id. at 302, 79 P.2d at 388.
' See also KRoG v. KRoc, 32 Cal. 2d 812, 198 P.2d 510 (1948).
0 Kotteman v. Kotteman, 150 Cal. App. 2d 483, 310 P.2d 49 (1957) (the court said that
in less aggravated situations courts have granted a stay but argued that such leniency had
failed in its purpose) ; Travis v. Travis, 89 Cal. App. 2d 292, 200 P.2d 843 (1948) (the court
said that it would be a flagrant abuse of equity to consider the demands of a party who
stands in contempt).
11 Kotteman v. Kotteman, supra note 10.
12 128 Cal. App. 2d 588, 275 P.2d 792 (1954).
23 Id. at 593.
Travis v. Travis, 89 Cal. App. 2d 292, 200 P.2d 843 (1948).
" 200 Cal. 652, 254 Pac. 266 (1927).
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was grounded upon respondent's failure to show either that the appellant was
financially able to comply or that the respondent was not able to defray those
expenses herself. It would seem that in such a situation it should be mandatory
for the appellant to pay the fees or show cause why he should not. The court was
straining when it denied the motion because the respondent failed to allege the
appellant's financial status. The appellant was the party in default, not the
respondent, and the burden of assessing the appellant's financial status should
have rested upon him and not the respondent.
In contrast is Kopasz v. Kopasz' 6 where on substantially similar facts the
court granted a stay until the party appealing complied with the order to pay.
The court distinguished Pugliese, reasoning that in that case there was no allega-
tion that the respondent could not pay her own fees, while there was such a
declaration in this case. What the court did not seem to heed was the assertion
by the appellant that he was unable to meet the costs and if forced to pay them
he would be precluded from pressing his appeal. The court held it would be better
to maintain the status quo by the stay rather than allow an appeal where the
respondent could not afford to be adequately represented.
Kopasz was subsequently cited by a respondent in an effort to have an appeal
stayed.1 The court denied the motion and said that Kopasz did not apply be-
cause the respondent failed to allege inability to satisfy her own costs and thus
the case was more like Pugliese. In Hardy v. Hardy,'5 Kopaz was again relied up-
on for a stay. All the necessary monetary allegations were made, but the court
refused to follow Kopasz, declaring that the granting of the stay is within the
discretion of the appellate court, and that a stay would not benefit the respondent.
Since the opening brief had been filed, the court reasoned, it would be better to
proceed with the appeal.
The result of the cases utilizing the stay of appeal is that the parties to a
cause of action are faced with incomplete distinctions and are placed on unsure
footing. On one hand, the courts have said that only if the moving party alleges
that he is unable to pay the various fees and also points out that the appellant
is able to pay them will the appellant be compelled to indemnify the respondent
as ordered by the lower court. On the other hand, the courts have passed over
these considerations and held that it is discretionary with the court to grant or
deny the stay.
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1634 Cal. 2d 423, 210 ,P.2d 846 (1949).
2, Dimon v. Dimon, 101 Cal. App. 2d 190, 225 P.2d 282 (1950).
18 156 Cal. App. 2d 347, 319 P.2d 380 (1957).
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